More attention to trade, more economic security

In Brussels, economic security is being conceived along three p’s: protect, promote, and partner. There is much discussion about defensive instruments, subsidies, and investments. The central questions are, for example: how can we counter American economic pressure? Should we also erect tariff barriers? Should the EU develop its own cloud? How do we keep out illegally subsidized Chinese products? How do we ensure that European and Dutch high-tech knowledge does not flow abroad? Which foreign investments are acceptable, and which are not? How do we protect our economic crown jewels, and how do we develop the European champions of the future?
These are all valid questions that contribute to the development of a new European industrial policy focused on economic security. But they only touch on the first two p’s: protect and promote. An important dimension is often missing, namely the notion that for economic security, partners are essential.

Two European Priorities
Trade is a crucial means of addressing current geopolitical tensions, maintaining our prosperity, and protecting ourselves from the vicious cycle of increasing protectionism, fragmentation, and loss of prosperity.
There are therefore two European priorities. On the one hand, the European internal market must be deepened to strengthen European competitiveness, but also to become less dependent on countries such as China and the US. Finally, a capital markets union, simplified European regulations, and new joint European initiatives in the high-tech and battery sectors are among the plans. These also have support in The Hague. Ultimately, European countries trade much more with each other than they do with countries outside the EU. Take Dutch trade in goods, for example. The Netherlands exports more to Belgium, Germany, or France individually than to China and the US combined. By deepening trade ties within the EU, we can become more resilient to new US tariffs or Chinese export restrictions. Dutch companies too should seek out opportunities also within the EU.
This also involves European industrial policy. Are we investing in Europe in the right sectors and at the right scale to strengthen our future competitiveness, such as semiconductors, biotech, AI, or quantum? It is distressing, for example, that in the last quarter of 2025 not a single ASML lithography machine was sold in the EU, even though everyone is talking about how a company such as ASML is an important European asset in the quest for economic security. Put your money where your mouth is.

Reorganization of the global trading system
The second thing the EU needs to address is diversifying its trade relations. This not only leads to the tapping of new markets, but it also a way to reduce unwanted dependencies. The deal with Mercosur countries has finally been approved. An agreement with India may follow early in 2026. These are positive developments. In addition, the EU is investigating whether cooperation can be developed with the trade bloc of countries around the Pacific Ocean. The CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) unites countries such as Australia, Japan, Canada, Vietnam, and Chile, and accounts for more than a third of global trade.
Collaboration with the EU could create enormous opportunities to set international standards, strengthen supply chains, facilitate trade in services, and seize the opportunities offered by growth economies. It also sends an important geopolitical signal to Washington and Beijing, which are not included. In addition, agreements with Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates are in the works. And about deglobalization? Globalization is changing. Whereas globalization was seen as a way to produce more efficiently and cheaply, it is now changing into a way to spread risks and tap into alternative markets and suppliers, as an insurance policy against geopolitical turbulence. Another way to put it is that we are moving from a system focused on 'just-in-time' to 'just-in-case'.
The reorganization of the global trading system as a result of changing geopolitics offers opportunities, certainly also for the Netherlands ‘as a trading nation.’ But are Dutch companies informed enough about the possibilities offered by new agreements, and how diversifying their own supply chains and markets contributes to their own resilience and business continuity? And is the Netherlands at the forefront of the European discussion on how the reorganization of trade flows can, or cannot, benefit us?

Trade: a neglected child
The Netherlands is engaged in a heated discussion about economic security. 'Project Beethoven' – a package of measures worth 2.51 billion euros to strengthen the microchip sector – and the Nexperia case are monopolizing the debate. Unfortunately, however, trade is a neglected child. In 2024, trade as a percentage of Dutch GDP was 154 percent. Few countries can match this position. This figure also shows that the Netherlands is highly exposed to developments in the trade sector. If the global economy falters, it is felt immediately in the Netherlands. If exports stall, it has a direct negative impact on Dutch growth figures.
Given the importance of international trade to our economy, we are obliged to play a leading role in European policymaking on trade and the new trade agreements that are being pursued. We are also obligated to have a proper national debate on trade policy. And this is where it becomes worrying.
Trade agreements are hot potatoes that politicians like to pass around. After much deliberation, the House of Representatives supported the agreement with the Mercosur countries by a narrow margin of seventy-six votes. Earlier support for the treaty with Canada was just as narrow. Dick Schoof did not go on any trade missions during his time as prime minister; he left that to the minister responsible for foreign trade. This minister has changed three times during the last very short cabinet term. This certainly does not strengthen the impression that trade is of any substantial importance to the politicians in The Hague.

A missed opportunity
Take the Wennink Report, perhaps the most important input for the new cabinet in economic terms. It is a sound report that will provide direction for a new Dutch industrial policy and a national investment agenda. The report states: ‘For centuries, we in the Netherlands have earned a large part of our money through our connections with other countries: in 2023, we exported 324.5 billion euros worth of Dutch-made products, and 35.2 percent of our total income is earned through international trade.’
So far, so good, but then it goes quiet. Trade is not mentioned again in the document. It is silent on new trade agreements, or on how trade policy is also part of broader industrial policy. It is a missed opportunity to encourage the Netherlands to play a proactive role in European thinking on the reorganization of globalization and to ensure that Dutch and European companies can benefit from it. Of the five largest EU countries, the Netherlands is by far the most exposed to international trade. A report with ideas on how to boost the Dutch economy is silent on one of the most important sources of our future earning capacity.
As trade and geopolitics become increasingly intertwined, an incisive dialogue on trade policy is essential for the economic security of the Netherlands and the success of Dutch business.

This essay was written by Rem Korteweg is a senior researcher at the Clingendael Institute and head of the Geopolitics of Trade program. He is co-author of the recently published book Impact of Geopolitics: How companies determine their strategy. Published in Management Scope 02 2026.